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There is a widespread view that political criteria have received less emphasis in aid 
allocation since the end of the cold war, with a greater share of aid subsequently being based 
on developmental criteria. An observed increase in aid effectiveness is attributed to this shift. 
A reasonably large literature on aid allocation supports this view: a number of influential, 
widely cited studies conclude that developmental criteria played no role in the 1970s and 
1980s inter-recipient aid allocation. This paper argues that the shift is not as significant as 
commonly thought. It points to a number of methodological weaknesses in the dominant 
modelling approach used within the literature, showing that more rigorous econometric 
methods suggest that developmental criteria have had a larger influence on cold war period 
aid allocation than previously thought. An alternative interpretation of the observed increase 
in aid effectiveness is provided. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The allocation of development aid among recipient countries has received increased 
scrutiny in recent years. After decades of generally inconclusive results, studies of the 
macroeconomic impact of aid now almost without exception conclude that aid works in 
promoting growth (Svensson (1999), Hansen and Tarp (2000a, 2000b), Dalgaard and 
Hansen (2001), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Hudson and Mosley (2001), Lu and 
Ram (2001), Dalgaard et al. (2002), Gounder (2001, 2002)). Some studies have 
concluded that this impact is conditional on the quality of the recipient country policy 
regime (Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000), Collier and Dollar (2002), Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002)). On the basis of this second finding, aid donor countries are now under 
increasing international pressure to base inter-country aid allocation on the perceived 
quality of recipient country policy regimes (McGillivray (2003)). This is thought to 
increase the ‘poverty efficiency’ of aid: giving preference in aid allocation to countries 
with better policy regimes means that the overall impact of aid on growth is higher, 
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which in turns means that poverty reduction is greater. 
There have been many attempts to interpret the conclusion that aid now works, and 
by implication better than before. A common interpretation is that donor agencies are 
now freer to pursue developmental or humanitarian as opposed to political, strategic 
commercial and related criteria in aid allocation following the end of the cold war. In 
short, these agencies now allocate more aid to countries which can use it better, and this 
accounts for the recent finding that aid now works in promoting growth. The decline in 
the share in total aid coming from the United States is also offered as an explanation. 
Aid from this donor is thought to have been especially influenced by non-developmental 
criteria, especially in the cold war period. These related assertions are derived in large 
part from studies of aid allocation conducted during the cold war. The most influential, 
widely-cited studies are those of McKinlay (1978), McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978a, 
1978b, 1979) and Maizels and Nissanke (1984), which empirically model aid allocation. 
McKinlay and Little (1979: 243) concluded that there are ‘no grounds for asserting that 
humanitarian criteria have any significant direct influence’ on aid US allocation. Maizels 
and Nissanke (1984: 891) concluded that US, British, French, German and Japanese 
‘bilateral aid allocations are made ... solely ... in support of donors’ perceived foreign 
economic, political and security interests’.  
The McKinlay-Little and Maizels-Nissanke research use the ‘recipient need’ and 
‘donor interest’ (RN-DI) modelling approach. This approach has dominated the 
literature on inter-recipient aid allocation from the late 1970s to the present. Recent 
RN-DI studies include Gounder (1999) and Gounder and Sen (1999). The approach 
involves separate estimation of two regression equations: one containing indicators of 
recipient need only and the other solely containing indicators of the donor interest. The 
former, the recipient need model, assumes that donors are motivated purely by 
humanitarian motives. The latter, the donor interest model, is premised on the 
assumption that donors are motivated purely by commercial, political and strategic self 
interests. Both models are fitted to sample data using the popular ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method of estimation. This estimation method is common not only to the 
recipient need-donor interest approach, but to aid allocation literature as a whole with 
the vast majority of studies using OLS. 
This paper has two linked objectives. First, it seeks to examine the econometric 
veracity of the RN-DI approach. It does this by reviewing the econometric methods used 
by RN-DI studies, and then fitting a model very similar to that used by Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) to 1980 United States aid data using a more rigorous econometric 
approach. The results of this exercise indicate that much of the popular views on aid 
allocation may well be wrong, including that regarding the increased emphasis to 
developmental criteria and, consequently, the related inference regarding the increased 
effectiveness of aid. This is because the results of the RN-DI studies of cold war aid 
allocation will have almost certainly provided biased results. The second objective of the 
paper is to provide a general econometric procedure for the modelling of inter-recipient 
aid allocation. This procedure involves the application of limited dependent variable 
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modelling techniques. These techniques are now used increasingly in recent aid 
allocation literature, although there remains significant scope for improvement in their 
application. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the perceived methodological 
shortcomings of the RN-DI approach and, in the context of foreign aid modelling, the 
OLS estimation method. Section 3 outlines an alternative, more econometrically 
rigorous approach hinging on the estimation of comprehensively specified (hybrid) 
models using limited dependent variable techniques. Two alternative limited dependent 
variable models are proposed along with a method of choosing between them. Section 4 
applies this approach to 1980 US aid allocations, showing that both recipient need and 
donor interest variables are relevant. Concluding comments are provided in Section 5, 
including an alternative interpretation of the observed increase in aid effectiveness. 
 
 
2.  SOME METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN MODELLING  
AID ALLOCATION 
 
2.1.  Sample Selection and OLS Estimation 
 
A task facing all aid allocation studies is drawing up a sample of potential recipient 
countries.1 Although not always made clear, studies have tended to include in the 
sample actual recipients - that is, those developing countries which have received 
non-zero aid allocations.2 The other option is to include all developing countries for 
which data are available.3 Most studies seem to have taken the second option, explicitly 
noting that the sample included both recipients and non-recipients of aid from the donor 
under consideration. Gounder (1994) explicitly discussed and elected for this section 
option. 
Both options are necessarily flawed if one uses the OLS estimation method. Let us 
consider the second option first. A possible scenario is shown below in Figure 1. Ai 
denotes some measure of aid to country i and is a decreasing function of Xi. Four 
countries are denied aid under this scenario. We therefore observe zero aid for these 
countries and the corresponding observations lie on the horizontal axis of Figure 1. With 
these non-recipients included in the sample, the OLS regression line is approximated by 
 
1 If the category of aid under consideration is official development assistance (ODA), this sample must be 
drawn from those classified by the OECD as developing. According to OECD guidelines, only developing 
countries are eligible for this category of aid. 
2 A variant of this approach is to include those which receive aid above some positive threshold. 
3 Other approaches are to include countries in a particular region or those belonging to a particular 
non-geographic grouping (such as low-income countries). But even if these approach are adopted, one must 
still decide whether to include or exclude non-recipients. 
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AA. Ignore for the moment the line BB. The application of OLS provides a regression 
line which is too flat in this example. As a result the absolute value of the regression 
coefficient is underestimated and the corresponding t ratio is overestimated. This 
particular result is due to the observations for which aid is zero lying to the right of all 
non-zero observations. But more generally, a misleading regression line will almost 
always be fitted if observations for which the aid variable equals zero are included in the 
sample and if these outcomes are the result of a non-random aid allocation process. 
Let us now consider the other option: excluding non-recipients from the sample. The 
observed regression equation underlying Figure 1 is:4 
 
,,,2,1, n . . .  = i        + X  +  = A iii µβα                                      (1) 
 
where α  is the vertical intercept, β  is a slope (regression) coefficient which is less 
than zero and iµ  is an error term. Figure 1 implies some threshold value of iX  that 
must not be exceeded for aid to be provided. In other words, the donor has 
systematically used iX  to partition recipients from non-recipients of aid. This may be 
re-stated as follows: 
 
iiiii XZZX    A βαµµβα  +    or        +   +    if0 −≤≤> ,                        (2) 
 
where Z  is the threshold. Clearly, by excluding observations for which aid is zero 
from the sample, one truncates iµ  and thus violates an assumption on which OLS is 
based: that the expected value of the error term is zero (i.e., 0][ =iE µ ). ][ iE µ  will 
actually be a function of the explanatory variable iX  and the application of OLS 
provides inconsistent estimates of β . In Figure 1, the expected value of iµ  increases 
with increases in iX  and OLS estimates of β  would, in this situation, be upward 
biased. This outcome is not dependent on the threshold being defined in terms of some 
value of a variable appearing on the right-hand side of the regression equation. Results 
will almost always be biased if there is non-random self-selectivity in the data. This 
applies to not only OLS, but all estimation techniques which do not recognise the limited 
(non-negative, non-zero) nature or aid allocations.5 
 
 
4 Strictly speaking, it can be stated that the regression equation underlying Figure 1 has a latent variable 
as its regression. This variable is observable only when its values are greater than zero, in which case it is 
assumed to equal Ai. We return to this below. 
5 This includes weighted least squares and seemingly unrelated regressors, as have been used in the aid 
allocation literature. See, for example, Katada (1997). 
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Figure 1.  Regression Lines 
 
 
2.2.  Specification Issues 
 
Our attention now turns more directly to the RN-DI modelling approach. Here we 
make an obvious point regarding specification bias. Studies which have used this 
approach essentially postulate that: 
 { }iii DIRNfA ,= ,                                                   (3) 
 
where iA  is some measure of aid to recipient i , iRN  and iDI  are vectors of 
recipient need and donor interest indicators, respectively. These studies then separately 
estimate the RN and DI models, which may respectively be written as follows: 
 
,10   + RN  +  = A iii µαα                                                (4) 
 
,10   + DI  +  = A iii εββ                                                 (5) 
 
where 0α  and 0β  are constants, 1α  and 1β  are vectors of coefficients and iµ  and 
iε  are error terms. This might well be an interesting approach to take, but it is 
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inherently problematic econometrically if one posits a priori that both recipient need and 
donor interests influence aid allocation.6 If this is the case, one must accept a priori that 
both models are mis-specified due to the omission of relevant variables. The 
consequences of this can be rather serious, as now demonstrated. 
It follows that the comprehensive model, that which RN-DI studies in essence 
postulate, is: 
 
.   + DI  + RN  +  = A iiii νγγγ 210                                          (6) 
 
It follows from Equations (4) to (6) that: 
 
νγγµ iii  + RN  +  = ′′ 20                                                  (7) 
 
and 
 
νγγε iii  + RN  +  = ′′′′ 10 .                                                (8) 
 
Unless it can be shown that none of the donor interest variables omitted from (4) are 
orthogonal with the recipient need variables omitted from (5), which is unlikely in the 
extreme, then it in turn follows that iµ  and iε  are not independent of their respective 
explanatory variables. The t  ratios, F  tests and R2s resulting from separate 
estimation of (4) and (5) are invalid, therefore, and the conclusions based on these 
statistics are likely to be misleading.  
The preceding analysis was conducted at an a priori level. Is it necessarily the case 
that the RN-DI approach yields biased results in practice? The answer is almost certainly 
yes. If any one or more of the recipient need variables is actually relevant to aid 
allocation, then the donor interest equation provides biased results. Conversely, if any 
one or more of the donor interest variables are relevant, then the recipient need equation 
provides biased results. Of course, it follows that if recipient need and donor interest 
variables are relevant, then both recipient need and donor equations yield biased results.  
The preceding outcome applies to many other categories of aid allocation studies, 
although unlike the RN-DI approach they are not inherently biased. These studies 
include those which have sought to test for biases in aid allocation,7 as well as those 
which have sought to look at the relationship between aid allocation and political and/or 
 
6 It is also theoretically ambiguous. There is no obvious theoretical rationale for using the RN-DI 
approach, and no such case is provided by the relevant studies. 
7 See, for example, OECD (1974); Isenman (1976); Dowling and Hiemenz (1985) and Arvin and Drewes 
(2001). 
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human rights variables only8 or developmental variables only.9 Each of the studies 
falling into these categories has reported results which are likely to be biased due to 
failing to estimate a comprehensively specified model of aid allocation. 
 
 
3.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
3.1.  Limited Dependent Variable Models 
 
If one continues modelling aid allocation using indicators of recipient need and 
donor interest (and there is merit in doing so), then the solution to the specification bias 
issue directly follows from the preceding analysis: estimate a comprehensively specified 
(hybrid) model of aid allocation. There is also a ready solution to the sample selection 
issue: retain all available observations in the sample and employ limited dependent 
variable techniques. The rationale for this approach can be demonstrated by the line BB 
in Figure 1. As mentioned, Figure 1 implies that there is some threshold value of iX  
that must not be exceeded for aid to be provided. Only aid amounts taking the value of 
zero for countries above this threshold are observed since a donor cannot allocate 
negative aid amounts10 Limited dependent variable techniques model the underlying or 
latent relationship, such as that shown by the line BB.11 This line basically says that if 
one could observe negative aid allocations, countries above the threshold would receive 
amounts indicated by the hollow dots in Figure 1. These amounts, like the non-zero 
allocations, are treated as latent potential aid amounts, which are only observed if the 
actual amounts are greater than zero or some other positive threshold. 
A family of limited dependent variable modelling techniques exists. Any number of 
specific techniques could be applied to aid allocation. Using the Amemiya (1984) 
classifications, the two seemingly most applicable are the Tobit Type I and Tobit Type II 
models, both of which are estimated using the maximum likelihood (ML) method. Those 
relatively few aid allocation studies which do use limited variables techniques tend to 
 
8 See, for example, Wittkopf (1973); McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978a and 1978b); Schoultz (1981); 
Stohl et al. (1984) and Carleton and Stohl (1987). 
9 See, for example, Davenport (1970); Henderson (1971); Kaplan (1975); Edelman and Chenery (1977); 
Anyadike-Danes and Anyadike-Danes (1992); Collins (1993); Trumball and Wall (1994) and Wall (1995). 
10 It is possible to observe negative aid amounts in practice if the measure of aid is net disbursements. 
This arises from recipient country repayments of previous period’s loans and not through a reversal of donor 
and recipient roles due to the value of some variable Xi. In other words, negative net disbursements do not 
and cannot arise from a conscious decision of the donor to allocate a negative amount to a given country. 
11 Strictly speaking, the line BB depicts only one of a number of possibilities and is represented by the 
Tobit Type I model outlined below. 
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select one of these approaches on a seemingly arbitrary basis. 12  Outlining the 
differences between them, in the context of aid allocation, and providing a basis for 
selecting one over the other is thus warranted.  
The Tobit Type II (sample selection) model describes a two-stage decisionmaking 
process in the context of aid allocation. In the first stage, the donor selects from a list of 
potential recipients a sample of countries which shall receive aid. Having done this, the 
donor in the second stage decides how much aid to allocate to each of these countries 
from a predetermined total pool of funds. Each of these countries receive a positive 
amount of aid. This has previously been described as a ‘yes/no and if yes, how much?’ 
process (see McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991, 1992)).13 The Type I model describes a 
one-stage process, where the donor deliberates simply between positive and zero aid 
amounts without first compiling a sample of countries which shall receive aid. We now 
formally outline these models.14 
For our current purposes the Type I Tobit model can be formally written as follows: 
 
),(~, 2210 σγγγ   0N  u          u + DI  + RN  +  = A iiii*i ,                          (9) 
 
where *iA  denotes a latent potential amount of aid to country i , iu  is an error term and 
the other variables and terms are as before. Normalized coefficients are used in estimation 
with the elements of 1γ  and 2γ  being divided by σ , the standard deviation of iu . The 
actual aid variable is iA . Its relationship to Equation (9) is: 
 
*
ii AA =   if  0* >iA , 
(10) 
0=iA   if  .0* ≤iA  
 
Both iA  and the vectors iRN  and iDI  are observed for i  = 1, 2, ..., n , but 
*
iA  is 
only observed (and is observable) for values greater than zero. 
 
12 For example, Gang and Lehman (1990) and Berthelemy and Tichit (2002) opt for Tobit Type I while 
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1991, 1992); Tarp et al. (1999) and Neumayer (2002) opt for Type II. 
McGillivray and Oczkowski do test for one model over the other, using a similar procedure to that outlined in 
this paper. 
13 It could be argued that there is indeed a three-stage decisionmaking process, with the first decision 
being drawing up the list of potential recipients. But, in the context of individual donor decisions, this would 
be erroneous if the focus is ODA (as is almost always the case). As mentioned above, only countries on the 
OECD list of developing countries can potentially receive ODA. Membership of this list is predetermined 
and is quite separate to the aid allocation decisions of individual donors. 
14 Additional details to those provided below can be found in Amemiya (1984). 
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The Tobit Type II model in the current context can be written as:15 
 
,),0( ~, 21,1,1210     Nz       z + DI + RN +  = E i i ii*i σδδδ  
                    (11) 
),0(~, 22,2,2210 σφφφ    N  z     z + DI + RN +  = A i i ii*i , 
 
where *iE  may be interpreted as the difference in the indirect utilities between 
allocating and not allocating aid to country i . *iE  is assumed to be positive if aid is 
allocated and equal to or less than zero if aid is not allocated. The error terms iz ,1  and 
iz ,2  jointly distributed with covariance 2,1σ  and Equations (11) are simultaneously 
estimated. In estimation each of the elements of 1φ  and 2φ  are divided by 2σ , the 
standard deviation of iz ,2 . The actual aid variables are iA  and a binary dummy iD . 
Their relationships to Equations (11) are: 
 
1=iD  if 0* >iE  and 0>iA , 
 
0=iD  if 0* ≤iE  and 0=iA , 
 
*
ii AA =  if 1=iD , 
 
0=iA  if 0=iD . 
 
In the first Equation of (11) we in effect observe the sign of *iE  (as indicated by the 
value of iD ), along with the vectors iRN  and iDI  for i = 1, 2, ..., n. In the second 
equation, we observe the potential amount of aid only if the net utility from allocating 
aid is greater than zero (in which case 1=iD ). However, for those i for which this is not 
so (in which case 0=iD ), then neither the potential amount, the actual amount or 
vectors iRN  and iDI  are observed. 
A fundamental issue is choosing between the two models of aid allocation. As 
mentioned, studies seem to arbitrarily opt for one over the other. Both models cannot 
simultaneously be true and it must be left to the data to choose between them. An 
appropriate and reasonably straightforward test exists. As Amemiya (1984) notes, the 
Type I model can be treated as a special case of its Type II counterpart. Provided the 
 
15 Equations (11) assume that the same set of factors determine the decision to allocate aid per se and the 
amount of aid allocated. This is merely for presentational convenience and it will not necessarily be true in 
practice. 
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same set of explanatory variables is used in both of the latter’s equations, it reduces to 
Equation (9) if 200 /σφδ = , 211 /σφδ = , 222 /σφδ =  and 2,12221 σσσ == . The 
appropriate test basically involves treating Equation (9) as a restricted version of 
Equations (11) and comparing the maximum likelihood values obtained from estimating 
each model. Specifically, it involves testing the null hypothesis 
 
:0H ,
2
0
0 σ
φδ = ,
2
1
1 σ
φδ = ,
2
2
2 σ
φδ = and 2,12221 σσσ ==  
 
using a likelihood ratio (LR) test evaluated as 
 ( ) ( )[ ]RUR LLLR ψψ lnln2 −=  ,                                        (12) 
 
where )( URL ψ  is the likelihood value for the unrestricted model (Equations (11)) and 
)( URL ψ  is that for the restricted model (Equation (9)). LR is asymptotically distributed 
as 2χ  under 0H , where r  is the number of restrictions required to define the null. 
 
3.2.  Further Hypothesis Tests 
 
A rationale for using the RN-DI approach is to see whether a group of need variables 
is important to aid allocation. This is an entirely appropriate question: aid is in principle 
about the promotion of development in those countries with the greatest need. The 
distribution of aid ought reflect, therefore, the relative needs of recipient countries. A 
way of ascertaining whether this is the case in practice, which does not involve looking 
at the functional fit of a recipient need model (an approach typically used in RN-DI 
papers), is warranted. A relatively straightforward alternative is to test the joint 
significance of the chosen recipient need coefficients (that is, in our current context, 
those attached to the elements of iRN ). In the case of Equation (9), for example, this 
involves testing the following null hypothesis: 
 
0: ,12,11,10  =   =. . . =  =   H
j
σ
γ
σ
γ
σ
γ
,                                        (13) 
 
where j  is the total number of elements of the vector 1γ . This nested hypothesis may 
be tested using the LR  ratio shown above. In this case, )( RL ψ  is obtained by 
estimating Equation (9) with each of the above recipient need coefficients restricted to 
zero (that is, with each of the corresponding variables dropped from the equation). 
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)( URL ψ  is obtained by estimating (9) with all variables retained in its specification.16 
This procedure can also be used to test the joint significance of the donor interest, but 
with each of the elements of the vector iDI  dropped from the relevant equation. Again 
using (9), the corresponding null hypothesis is: 
 
0: ,22,21,20  =   =. . . =  =   H kσ
γ
σ
γ
σ
γ
,                                       (14) 
 
where k  is the total number of elements of the vector 2γ .  
 
 
4.  UNITED STATES COLD WAR AID ALLOCATION 
 
Does the use of the more econometrically correct modelling approach matter in 
practice? In particular, would it lead us to draw different conclusions? In this section we 
answer these questions by applying the limited dependent variable techniques to 1980 
United States official development assistance (ODA) data for a sample of 96 developing 
countries.17 US aid data, especially those for the late 1970s and early 1980s, are of 
particular interest. Not only have they received more scrutiny in the literature than those 
of any other donor, but were used by Maizels and Nissanke (1984) to reject need as a 
basis for aid allocation.18 Moreover, the increase in observed effectiveness of aid is in 
part attributed to a decline in the share of US aid in total aid.  
The sample of developing countries was chosen purely on the basis of data 
availability. It includes 20 countries which did not receive aid from the US in 1980. The 
indicators of recipient need are GNP per capita, population size, the infant mortality rate 
and annual GDP growth. The donor interest variables are the value of US arms transfers 
to country i , the value of US exports to i , a western hemisphere dummy taking the 
value of one if i  is located in that part of the world and zero if otherwise and a special 
 
16 If one persists with OLS, this hypothesis is evaluated by comparing the sum of squared residuals from 
the restricted equation (RSSR) to that from the unrestricted equation (RSSUR) using the following F test: 
 
k) - /(NRSS
)/rRSS - RSS( = F
UR
URR , 
 
where r is the number of restrictions (i.e., dropped variables), N is the number of observations and k is the 
total number of coefficients in the unrestricted equation. If the null hypothesis is true, this test statistic will 
have an F distribution with r degrees of freedom in the numerator and N - k in the denominator.  
17 Further details of the sample are available from the author. 
18 More precisely, Maizels and Nissanke (1984) used average 1978-80 ODA allocations. 
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relationship dummy taking the value of one for Israel and Egypt and zero for all other 
countries. Arms transfers are expressed per head of i’s population. Exports are expressed 
as a ratio of world exports (net of those from the US) to country i . These variables are 
typical of those used in RN-DI studies and most closely resemble the group of variables 
used by Maizels and Nissanke (1984). In keeping with the standard practice of these 
studies, the aid variable is expressed in per capita terms (that is, per head of i’s 
population).19 Data were obtained from United States Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (1987), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1984), 
World Bank (1992) and International Monetary Fund (1984). 
Let us first consider the Tobit ML results. These and all other results are shown in 
Table 1. The hypothesis outlined in Equation (12) above was rejected at the 95 percent 
confidence level and, as such, the Tobit Type II model was rejected by the data in favour 
of its Type I counterpart. As shown in Table 1, a likelihood ratio testing the joint 
significance of all coefficients other than the constant was found to be significant at the 
95 percent level. The null hypothesis that 04,22,11,1 ==== γγγ K  is therefore 
rejected.20 The coefficients of four variables - GNP per capita, population, arms 
transfers and the special relations dummy - were each found to be significantly different 
from zero. Based on these results one would conclude, therefore, that both donor interest 
and recipient need variables seem relevant to 1980 US per capita aid allocation. This 
conclusion is further supported by the likelihood ratios LRRN and LRDI, which 
respectively test for the joint significance of the coefficients attached to the recipient 
need and donor interest variables. In particular, the sign attached to and significance of 
GNP per capita’s coefficient is fully consistent with allocating aid according to need and 
related humanitarian principles. The only anomaly is the coefficient attached to 
population, 3,1γ . This coefficient is negative, suggesting that there is a bias favouring 
small countries in per capita aid. Known in the literature as the ‘small country effect’, 
this is in contradiction to the typical assumptions of the RN model and needs-based aid 
allocation principles in general. 
Remarkably similar results to those reported by previous studies were obtained from 
the OLS regressions, especially those relating to the RN and DI models estimated with 
observations for which dependent variable is equal to zero retained in the sample. In 
particular, on the basis of these results, one would have wrongly concluded that recipient 
need variables individually and collectively have no significant impact on US aid 
allocation.  
 
 
19 Note that the choice of per capita aid is a controversial one that is yet to be settled in the literature. 
There is a strong argument that absolute aid is the decision variable of donors. Here the former was chosen on 
the basis of the RN-DI studies using it. 
20 Since the Tobit model has been estimated using the ML approach, a traditional goodness of fit statistic, 
such as an R2, is not available. 
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Estimates of RN and DI models obtained with all observations included in the sample 
would lead to the conclusion that these variables jointly have no such impact, but that 
income per capita was positively and significantly related individually with inter-country 
US aid receipts. Both of these sets OLS estimates fail to detect the small country effect. 
OLS estimates of the hybrid model also fail to detect this effect and lead to the 
erroneous conclusion that recipient need variables collectively have no significant 
impact. OLS estimates of the hybrid model obtained with all observations retained in the 
sample at least detect the negative correlation between income per capita and US aid. All 
OLS estimates correctly identify the importance of donor interest variables. 
What are the implications of our analysis for previous studies and popular opinion on 
aid allocation? Three points can be made. First, one must question the results of all 
studies which do not estimate comprehensively specified (or hybrid) models of aid 
allocation and do not take into account the limited nature of aid allocations. This is 
irrespective of the results that have been obtained by these studies. Second, further doubt 
is cast on those studies which have totally rejected need and accepted the importance of 
donor interest as criteria for aid allocation, especially with respect to US aid for the late 
1970s and early 1980s. This is not to say that the conclusions of these studies are 
necessarily wrong, simply that one cannot rely at all on these conclusions to be correct. 
Thirdly, and more profoundly, the fact that US aid seems to have been motivated by 
developmental criteria during at least one of cold war years calls for reconsideration of 
the view that the increase in development aid effectiveness is in part due to the declining 
share of this donor’s aid in total aid. This is not to say that aid is now based more on 
developmental criteria than previously, but it does question the extent to which this is 
the case. 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper addressed two perceived methodological shortcomings in the aid 
allocation literature. Implicitly, as well, it questioned the validity of the conclusions 
drawn by some of the more influential studies belonging to this literature, including the 
rejection of relative need (and, hence, the humanitarian motive) as a criterion for aid 
allocation. The first shortcoming concerns aid as a limited dependent variable and 
applies to all previous inter-country aid allocation models estimated using the OLS 
method. This represents the overwhelming majority of aid allocation studies. The second 
shortcoming relates to studies which have used the recipient need/donor interest 
(RN-DI) modelling approach. The paper argued that this approach is inherently 
problematic due to specification bias in the recipient need and donor interest equations. 
At least one of these equations will almost certainly give biased results. Indeed, if one 
accepts that both the recipient need and donor interests influence aid allocation, then one 
must necessarily accept that all results of these studies are potentially biased. The  
paper subsequently suggested alternative procedures for testing the relevance of 
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recipient need and donor interest variables and modelling aid allocation in general. 
These are related to estimating hybrid equations using limited dependent variable 
modelling techniques. Two limited dependent variable models were outlined - Tobit 
Type I and II. An application of these techniques to 1980 US development aid cast 
further doubt on the veracity of the conclusions drawn by RN-DI studies. 
Given this doubt, alternative interpretations of the observed increase in development 
aid effectiveness is warranted. A number of alternatives could be identified, but here we 
briefly outline one. The observed increase in aid relies in part on the results of studies of 
aid effectiveness conducted throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, in much the 
same way it relies on cold war aid allocation studies. Almost 30 years of research on aid 
and growth produced little or no evidence that aid worked in promoting growth. 
Burnside and Dollar (1997) represent a turning point in this respect. It was the first study 
to confidently conclude that aid worked, and its general result - that aid increases growth 
- has been confirmed by practically all subsequent studies. Yet these earlier aid 
effectiveness studies have been criticized very heavily on theoretical and empirical 
grounds. White (1992) is one of a number of studies which concludes that these studies 
tell us little if anything, about the effectiveness of aid. Among the criticisms of these 
studies is that they fail to control for non-aid impacts on growth, something which the 
Burnside and Dollar and subsequent studies address. It follows that the observed 
increase in aid effectiveness might not be real. That is, it could be the case that aid has 
always been effective in promoting growth, and the pre-Burnside and Dollar studies 
simply fail to detect this. 
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